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Abstract
In a two-region model, we formalize Kindleberger’s idea that wealth breeds ﬁrst
more wealth, and then decline: when one region leads, its inhabitants develop con-
sumption habits incompatible with the necessary investment in knowledge to remain
the leader. This gives the other region a window of opportunity to gain economic
primacy. We learn from the theoretical model that diﬀerences across regions that
have similar characteristics may persist even if physical capital ﬂows from rich to
poor regions. By exploiting the economics of the Hopf bifurcation we study patterns
of alternating primacy, irreversible decline, and monotonic convergence, according
to the initial dispersion of knowledge and the strength of consumption habits. Even
though exogenous factors may matter on some occasions, we show that they are not
necessary to reverse economic leadership.
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Benchmark neo-classical growth models predict that per capita incomes of regions that
are identical in their structural characteristics converge with one another in the long run
independently of their initial conditions ((Galor 1996)). This view seems to be broadly
supported by recent data, see e.g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991), although the estimated
pace of convergence is rather slow. Over longer periods, however, historical data show
that convergence, if any, is neither smooth nor monotonic. Regions overtake and surpass
others in economic leadership, and regions being caught up with may in some cases decline
absolutely. In some other cases, they can have a rebirth (Landes 1998). Even in countries
where capital mobility is close to perfect, economic primacy can alternate from one region
to another. Examples of such dynamics are provided in section 1.
In this paper, we build a model where leapfrogging does not rely on exogenous shocks,
and where convergence is not guaranteed although capital is perfectly mobile across re-
gions/countries. Our aim is not to claim that exogenous shocks are unimportant but to
stress that they are not necessary to account for reversals of leadership. We argue that
describing the state of a region by its stocks of physical and human capital is not enough
to understand its economic superiority over others. Kindleberger (1996) defends the view
that economies, like human bodies, go through a life cycle along which “vitality” varies,
depending on how entrepreneurial each generation is. The Venetian Maritime Republic
declined when leaders started to devote more time to consumption rather than investing
in the improvement of shipping techniques, the discovery of new routes, etc. Florence
and its famous banking sector declined when Lorenzo the Magniﬁcent delegated power
over the Medici bank branches as he turned to the high life. In order to capture the idea
that rich regions tend to rest on their laurels, and are inclined to favor consumption over
investment in knowledge, we introduce a stock of consumption habits in a regional growth
model.
Our model economy consists of two regions or two countries where physical capital is
perfectly mobile. Both regions produce the same commodity with the same technology and
have the same preferences, although they may have diﬀerent initial levels of knowledge.
Along their growth path, regions diﬀer in the stock of consumption habits – or standard-
of-living aspirations – that is built from the previous generation. In other words, each
generation’s propensity to consume depends positively on what their parents consumed.
At some point of a development process, the young generation of the richer region develops
1living standards that are incompatible with the necessary investment in knowledge to
remain the leader. This reduces the growth rate in comparison with the other region. At
some point in a decline process, consumption is low again and a new growth cycle may
start. This process may or may not end in regional convergence.
In the literature, diﬀerent approaches have been followed to explain regional income dy-
namics, all relying on the interaction between centrifugal forces and convergence forces.
The new economic geography approach stresses the role of increasing returns to scale and
low transportation costs to account for the presence of economic agglomerations. Con-
trary to standard growth theory, “catastrophic” agglomeration prevails, not convergence.
This is especially true if one allows for physical capital mobility (see for example Desmet
(2002)). Although this view successfully accounts for the growth of large poles of devel-
opment, it falls short of explaining why the periphery does not decline irreversibly, losing
all its main input in favor of the core. A response to this shortcoming is proposed by
Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002). They study cases where agglomeration generates
urban costs hindering the overwhelming growth of the core. Examples of these costs are
land rents and commuting costs. When these costs are added, their model is able to pro-
duce the pattern dispersion/agglomeration/re-dispersion. Although this setup provides
richer dynamics than the standard economic geographic model, it does not allow for the
repetition of this pattern over time. This means that the core will never rebound unless
an exogenous change occurs. This is generally how leapfrogging is modelled in otherwise
stationary models. For instance, Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) assume that a
new technology all a sudden becomes available in the world economy. The rich region has
little incentive to adopt it because it loses its accumulated experience and must spend
some time learning how to use the new technology. As for the poor region, if it has little
experience in the old technology, it will adopt the new one, catch up with its neighbor,
and eventually take the leadership.
An alternative framework is proposed by the human capital literature. Despite divergence
forces like social stratiﬁcation across districts and regional funding of education, conver-
gence forces predominates: for Benabou (1996) social stratiﬁcation has a cost (housing
rents) which reduces the income growth in richer districts. Tamura (2001) suggests that
social stratiﬁcation is not the dominating force as long as teachers’ quality is the main
input in the production of human capital. Thanks to teachers’ mobility, relative teaching
quality (ratio of teachers’ to parents’ human capital) is higher in poor districts and human
capital levels converge across states. The models of Benabou (1996) and Tamura (2001)
2explain why human capital in rich regions can grow at a slower pace than in poor regions.
However, they account for neither leapfrogging nor decline. Galor, Moav, and Vollrath
(2002) build a model with human capital where a country can overtake a richer one if it
starts with a more equal distribution of land. When some landlords own a large fraction
of the land in the economy, they impede human capital accumulation opposing education
policy.1 An advantage of this setup is that overtaking depends on initial conditions and
not on exogenous shocks. However, the mechanism invoked is likely to be weakened if
capital mobility across countries is allowed.
An emerging alternative view considers that institutions, understood in a broad sense, are
a key determinant of income diﬀerences and reversals. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2002) argue that relatively rich countries colonized by European powers in 1500 are
now relatively poor and vice versa. They explain this “reversal of fortune” by the types
of institutions imposed by the European settlers. “Extractive” institutions were intro-
duced in the relatively rich countries, beneﬁting the settlers rather than the countries.
In the relatively poor areas, no plundering incentives existed to prevent the building of
investment-friendly institutions. As a result, the decline or rise of those countries is rooted
in a major – exogenous – institutional change linked to colonization.
Section 1 illustrates and discusses some historical examples of decline and alternating
primacy. The model is introduced in section 2. Regional dynamics are analyzed in
section 3. The role of capital mobility is explicitly studied in section 4. The role of
initial conditions in shaping future rise and decline is illustrated in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
1 Examples of alternating primacy
Historical evidence suggests that economic development is anything but linear. This holds
at world level, within continents and within countries.
In the ﬁfth century, the fall of the Western Roman Empire and its defeat by scattered
tribes mark the end of European economic primacy to the beneﬁt of the Middle East
1A similar idea is put forward by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) to explain the role of initial inequality
in shaping the development of New World economies.
3and Asia. Whichever cause is argued,2 this defeat would never have been possible if
this powerful empire had not decomposed internally, leaving the many with “no bread”
and giving the few “too many games”: physical and human resources were allocated
to entertainment instead of investment in knowledge and infrastructure. The economic
decline of Europe turned out to be overwhelming until the ﬁfteenth century. Thereafter,
Europe experienced a long wave of economic rebirth and other zones, like the Muslim
world, declined.
The history of regions is not more linear. The demographic ﬂuctuations of cities, con-
sidered as a proxy for regional economic activity (see Bairoch (1991) and Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2002)) witness waves of development and decline. Amalﬁ, in
Southern Italy, was the Italian largest city-state in the tenth century with 60,000-80,000
people. Now it is a small town of 7,000 inhabitants while Naples, a neighboring and com-
peting city-state to Amalﬁ in the Middle Ages, now has more than one million inhabitants.
In the Middle Ages Southern Europe was more prosperous and literate than the North.
In the eleventh century Cordoba had 400,000-500,000 inhabitants, Palermo 350,000 and
Seville 100,000. At the same time, Paris and London had 20,000-25,000, (see Bairoch,
Batou, and Ch` evre (1988)). Then the South lost its primacy. Between the ﬁfteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the economic center of gravity in Europe successively moved from
Italy to Spain and Portugal, then to the Netherlands. Finally, England became the great
economic power while Portugal, Spain and Southern Italy were already lagging far behind.
These diﬀerent economic development patterns are often explained by several “exogenous”
factors: invasion, war, geography, institutions, technology etc. Kindleberger (1996) argues
that some of these factors may have ultimate economic causes: bad political decisions may
be taken when the quality of institutions has deteriorated following a lack of investment
by the elite. The inability to maintain competition also stems from a loss of interest
by leaders. The development pattern of the territories that are now Belgium and the
Netherlands provides a good example of this mechanism. Figure 1 reports the GDP
per capita, normalized by the mean, from Maddison (1995). Figure 2 reports the relative
2The ﬁrst comprehensive survey of the causes of the decline is by Gibbon (1845). In the recent book
by Schiavone (2000), the roots of the decline are to be found in the behavior of the aristocracy, preferring
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Figure 3: Population of big cities
population of big cities, as a share of the total.3 Before 1500, Belgium was clearly leading,
with ﬂourishing cities like Bruges and Antwerp. Then Bruges, followed by Antwerp,
declined and Amsterdam rose. The real force behind the decline of Bruges was its inability
to meet the competition, because of the increasing conservatism of Bruges traders and
bankers (Kindleberger 1996). The decline of the Netherlands in the eighteenth century
is related to the same kind of behavior (see section 5). After the Dutch decline, Belgium
catched up and overtook its neighbor, thanks to a faster industrialization. Then, in the
twentieth century, Belgium did not manage to maintain its primacy, and the Netherlands
experienced a re-birth compared to Belgium.
Figures 3 show other examples of alternating primacies involving border regions: Vienna
versus Prague and Naples versus Sicily (Palermo + Catania + Messina). Alternation is
particularly striking given that capital is likely to be mobile and should have enforced
either convergence (in case of decreasing returns) or core-periphery agglomeration.
2 A simple model of reversal
Our model is an overlapping generations model with physical capital and knowledge.
It describes an economy with two regions, A and B, in which generations live for two
3Source: Bairoch, Batou, and Ch` evre (1988) for 1000-1850 and “populstat” web site by Jan Lahmeyer
for 1900-2000. Big cities (those that amounted to had 50,000 inhabitants or more at some point before
1850) are Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels, Gent and Liege in Belgium; Amsterdam, Leiden, Rotterdam, ’S
Gravenhaegue in the Nertherlands.
6periods. For the sake of simplicity, the growth rate of the population is zero and the
size of the regional population is normalized to one. In the ﬁrst period of their life,
households work, consume and invest a part of their income in physical capital which
is rented and used by the ﬁrms in the next period. They invest another part of their
income to accumulate knowledge. When old, they consume the returns on their savings
and die. At each date ﬁrms produce a single commodity under constant returns to scale
technology. This commodity can either be consumed or accumulated as capital for future
production. Capital is perfectly mobile across regions while labor is immobile.
2.1 Preferences
For a young household of region i, preferences are represented by the following utility
function:
ln(ci,t − γai,t) + β ln(di,t+1) + λln(ei,t) i = A,B, (1)
where ci,t represents youth-age consumption, ai,t represents consumption habits, di,t+1
old-age consumption and ei,t spending on knowledge. The parameter γ ∈ (0,1) stands for
the inﬂuence of habits on preferences and λ > 0 is the parameter governing the taste for
spending revenue on education. The parameter β > 0 is the discount factor. The stock of
habits is built from the consumption of the previous generations (see de la Croix (2001)
and de la Croix and Michel (2002)):
ai,t = ci,t−1. (2)
Thus it is as though children became accustomed to a certain consumption level when
they are still living with their parents.
In equation (1) we assume that the depreciation rate (or forgetting rate) of consump-
tion habits is so high that old persons are no longer aﬀected by them. This simplifying
assumption proxies the idea that aspirations are less important for older persons. This
is supported by the empirical observation that reported satisfaction levels in happiness
surveys increases with age. Old households put less weight on comparisons to evaluate
their welfare (see e.g. Clark, Oswald, and Warr (1996)). The term λln(ei,t) represents
“joy-of-giving” altruism: providing education resources to their children makes parents
happy.
72.2 Technology






where Yi,t is the output of region i at time t, Ki,t is physical capital, Ni,t is the labor input,
and Ai,t is the level of technology. Physical capital is assumed to be fully depreciated after
one period. Technology depends on knowledge hi,t:
Ai,t = A h
µ
i,t.
The parameter µ represents the elasticity of total factor productivity to knowledge and A is
a scale parameter. We assume that the total returns to reproducible inputs are decreasing,
i.e., µ + α < 1, to stay within the framework of neo-classical growth. Our interest is to
study centrifugal forces that do not rely on the endogenous growth mechanism. Rewriting
the production function in per capita terms, we have:











Knowledge is the engine of technical progress. We assume for simplicity that knowledge
depends linearly on the amount of goods invested in it:
hi,t+1 = ψei,t, (4)
where ei,t represents the amount of goods devoted to education and ψ is a technologi-
cal parameter, that we normalize to one, without loss of generality: ψ = 1. Through
consumption of the education commodity, each generation invests a part of its income in
regional knowledge.
82.3 Optimal behaviors
The regional representative consumer maximizes (1) subject to:
ci,t + si,t + ei,t = wi,t,
di,t+1 = Ri,t+1si,t.
Savings are denoted si,t; the real wage is wi,t and the interest factor is Ri,t+1.












(wi,t − γai,t), (7)
where δ = β + λ. Equations (5)-(7) depict an essential feature of the model. When past
consumption ai,t is high, a larger share of income is devoted to current consumption, and
a lower share to investment in knowledge and physical capital. Moreover, savings are





The regional representative ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts subject to (3). Marginal productivities












At equilibrium, the interest factor is identical in both regions since capital is perfectly
mobile:
RA,t = RB,t = Rt. (11)
9The total stock of capital is built from the savings of the young generation:
Kt+1 = KA,t+1 + KB,t+1 = NA,tsA,t + NB,tsB,t. (12)




A,0 kB,0 = h
µ
1−α
B,0 kA,0, and kA,0 + kB,0 =
β
λ
(hA,0 + hB,0) (13)
a competitive equilibrium can be characterized by a path {hi,t,ai,t,ki,t}i=A,B;t>0 such that
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Equation (14) describes the accumulation of knowledge using equations (4), (5), and
(10). Equation (15) gives the stock of habits as a function of past consumption through
(2), (6), and (10). Equation (16) equalizes savings and investment (assuming constant
population Ni,t = 1), and is derived from (4), (8) and (12); it reﬂects the fact that savings
are proportional to spending on knowledge. Equation (17) ﬂows from the perfect capital
mobility assumption, and is derived from equations (9) and (11).






i,t > γai,t ∀t > 0. (18)
Clearly, if it exists, it is unique.
3 Regional dynamics with consumption habits
We now derive some theoretical properties of the equilibrium that we use to characterize
regional development patterns. Numerical examples will then be provided.
103.1 Steady state and dynamics
Proposition 1 [Steady state]
The dynamic system described by equations (14)-(17) allows for a unique non-trivial steady
state. This steady state is symmetric:
¯ hA = ¯ hB = ¯ h =
￿
A(1 − α)(1 − γ)λ1−αβα












Proof: see appendix A.
From these expressions, we see that the stock of knowledge is decreasing in parameter
γ, which measures the importance of habits in household preferences. Since ¯ k is also
decreasing in γ, output per capita is decreasing in γ as well. Looking at the local stability
of the steady state, we get the following result:
Proposition 2 [Hopf bifurcation]
There exists a value γ1 ∈ (0,1) such that at γ = γ1 the steady state (19) is non-hyperbolic,
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the linearized system have moduli less than unity with
the exception of a conjugate pair of complex eigenvalues of modulus 1, {`γ, ¯ `γ}. This pair
of eigenvalues also satisﬁes `3
γ 6= 0, `4
γ 6= 0 and ∂`γ/∂γ > 0 at γ = γ1. γ1 is given by the
following expression:
γ1 =
(1 + δ)(1 + α + µ) −
p
(1 + δ)2(1 + α + µ)2 − 4δ(1 + δ)(α + µ)
2δ(α + µ)
.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 establishes that a Hopf bifurcation occurs when the weight attached to
past consumption becomes large enough. The presence of a Hopf bifurcation determines
crucially the economic properties of the model. Indeed, dynamics around the bifurcation
point are oscillatory; they converge to the steady state if the parameter γ lies on the low
side of the critical point, accounting for non-monotonic convergence behavior. Moreover,
bifurcation theory shows that there is an invariant manifold diﬀeomorphic to a circle on
11one side of the bifurcation point (Ruelle 1989). If this manifold is on the stable side, it is
repelling and determines a basin of attraction of the steady state. Hence two worlds with
almost identical initial conditions but lying on diﬀerent sides of the manifold might display
dramatically diﬀerent growth patterns: the one starting inside the cycle will be attracted
to the steady state, and its regions will ﬁnally converge; the other will be repelled from the
steady state, and regional disparities will not vanish. If the manifold is on the unstable
side, it is then attracting, and economies that do not converge to the steady state will
ﬂuctuate forever.
The Hopf bifurcation argument is only valid in a neighborhood of the steady state and
of the parameter critical value. We can however prove a more general stability result for
any value of γ in its deﬁnition interval:
Proposition 3 [Local dynamics]
The steady state (19) is locally stable for all γ ∈ (0,γ1). There exists γ ∈ (0,γ1) for which
local dynamics are oscillatory if γ ∈ (γ,γ1).
Proof: see Appendix C.
Hence, the interval (0,γ1) can be divided into two sub-intervals. If γ ∈ (0,γ), then the
system converges monotonically. If γ ∈ (γ,γ1), convergence is oscillatory.
3.2 Numerical example
In this two-region economy four forces are at work: diminishing returns on physical cap-
ital, diminishing returns on knowledge, mobility of physical capital across regions and
consumption habits. The ﬁrst three are convergence forces and the fourth is a divergence
force. We simulate the model to illustrate how these forces interact as a function of the
initial knowledge and of the parameter γ. Figure 4 displays regional GDP4 in four cases.
In all examples, the parameter values are: α = 1/3, β = 1/2, λ = 1/2, µ = 1/2, A = 10.
The corresponding Hopf bifurcation value, γ1, is 0.63795. In our ﬁrst three examples,
we have chosen a value for the weight of habits close enough to the bifurcation value:
γ = 0.62; a large value of γ is consistent with the weak link found in the literature be-
tween income and reported satisfaction by households (de la Croix 1998). The associated
4We have also drawn the ﬁgures with regional GNP, which equals in our case yi,t + Rt(si,t−1 − Ki,t).
The income from abroad is small compared to GDP, and the dynamics are the same.
12eigenvalues are complex: `1,2 = 0.911579 ± 0.327386 i and `3,4 = 0.835921 ± 0.381547 i.
In our last example, we have chosen a small value for γ, 0.05.
Initial conditions are aA,0 = aB,0 = ¯ a; kA,0 and kB,0 are set so that the interest rate R0
equals its long-term value. We then consider three diﬀerent sets of initial conditions for
knowledge. In Panel (i), region A is endowed with a level of knowledge above its steady
state value, while region B starts at the same distance from the steady state but below it:
hA,0 = ¯ h × 1.751, hB,0 = ¯ h/1.751. Both regions have thus diﬀerent stocks of knowledge
but equal consumption habits. Due to the presence of diminishing returns on physical
capital and knowledge, the poorer region is expected to grow faster during the ﬁrst few
periods. In fact, output decreases initially in the poor region because its initial habits are
burdensome. In other words, consumption habits become an obstacle to the accumulation
of knowledge. In particular, future returns on physical capital are dragged down by low
level of productivity, and the poor region is unable to attract foreign capital. Their relative
positions start changing when the poor region’s consumption goes low enough, allowing
a larger share of revenue to be devoted to investment in knowledge. As a result, the poor
region grows faster and overtakes the rich region at t = 8. Then, habits become hard to
bear again and the region declines from t = 13. As time goes by, the waves synchronize
due to the three convergence forces while their amplitude diminishes.
In Panel (ii), the distance between initial knowledge levels and the steady state is in-
ﬁnitesimally longer than in Panel (i): hA,0 = ¯ h × 1.752, hB,0 = ¯ h/1.752. This illustrates
the case when initial conditions do not lie within the basin of attraction deﬁned by the
repelling manifold. The local stability results obtained in the previous section do not
apply and the economies do not converge. After t = 14 condition (18) is violated for the
initially rich region, wages are insuﬃcient to fulﬁl consumption habits, and its decline is
irreversible.
In Panel (iii), both regions have initial knowledge below the steady state, with a higher
level in region A: hA,0 = ¯ h×0.8, hB,0 = ¯ h×0.7 (the exercise could also have been carried
out with two regions above steady state). Alternating primacy occurs again but waves
are synchronized from the beginning. These waves are still generated by the large weight
of consumption habits. The similarity of initial physical capital, knowledge and habit
stocks implies the same behavior of both economies over time. The mechanism explained
for Panel (i) applies, the waves become less and less ample and eventually convergence
takes place.
13(i): Alternating primacy
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(ii): Irreversible decline
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(iii): Synchronized waves
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(iv): Monotonic convergence
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Figure 4: Numerical examples: yA,t (dotted line), yB,t (solid line)
In Panel (iv), initial conditions are the same as in Panel (i), but remember that the
parameter γ is much lower. Convergence forces always dominate habits and dynamics are
monotonic. Our model thus behaves like a traditional neo-classical growth model for low
values of γ.
4 The role of capital mobility
In the previous sections, we have shown that diminishing returns and perfect capital
mobility do not guarantee fast convergence. This result contrasts with what happens in
the two-country one-sector model with two factors (Buiter 1981). To assess the speciﬁc
role of capital mobility, we examine the model when capital is immobile. We expect
























ki,t = si,t−1 =
β
λ
hi,t, i = A,B. (22)
Given initial conditions {hi,0,ai,0,ki,0}i=A,B satisfying ki,0 = β/λhi,0 for i = A,B, a com-
petitive equilibrium can be characterized by a path {hi,t,ai,t,ki,t}i=A,B;t>0 such that equa-
tions (20)-(22) hold. The analysis of this system is much simpler because we can study
each region separately. We can show that there is a unique non-trivial steady state, which
is the same as the one with perfect capital mobility. It turns out that there is also a Hopf
bifurcation for the parameter γ. The value of the bifurcation point is γ1, the same as in
the case of perfect capital mobility.
Proposition 4 [No capital mobility]
With no capital mobility, the steady state is locally stable for γ ∈ [0,γ1). For γ in a
neighborhood on the left of γ1, the speed of convergence is slower than with perfect mobility
of capital.
Proof: See appendix D.
Proposition 4 proves that the convergence speed is higher when capital is perfectly mobile
across regions. A similar result obtains in two-country models when a third immobile
production factor such as land is introduced. Mountford (1996) shows that for reasonable
values of the elasticity of substitution between land and capital, convergence is faster when
capital is mobile. Moreover capital mobility has other implications which can be high-
lighted numerically: it enlarges the basin of attraction of the steady state and promotes
regional synchronization. Let us detail these two points in turn.
In the left panel of Figure 5 we take the example of one region without mobility of capital
with the same parameters values as in panel A of Figure 4. In bold, we plot the invariant
manifold in the space {a,h}, homeomorphic to a circle, which surrounds the stable steady
state. If the initial conditions of one region lie inside the circle, the region converges to the
steady state. If they lie outside, the economy diverges and condition (18) is violated at
some point in time. The solid line reports the trajectory of the same region when there is
15Limit cycle
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Figure 5: Numerical example without capital mobility
capital mobility (from the example in panel A of Figure 4). We observe that it converges
to the steady state, although it started outside the circle; it implies that, if capital was
prevented from ﬂowing from one region to the other, the trajectory would have diverged.
As a result, a region can start from a more distant point from the steady state with
perfect capital mobility. For example, households can aﬀord higher consumption habits
when capital is mobile since their region has the possibility of attracting foreign physical
capital.
The right panel of Figure 5 depicts the dynamics of regional outputs with the same
parameters, but starting closer to the steady state to ensure convergence: hA,0 = ¯ h×1.5,
hB,0 = ¯ h/1.5. We see that the synchronization of regional outputs has disappeared. We
can conclude that capital mobility is the force of synchronization.
5 Case study: Belgium – Netherlands (1500-2000)
Contrary to the literature which relies on exogenous shocks to explain leapfrogging, our
framework stresses the role of initial conditions. To better understand their role in shaping
the future, we have used the model to simulate the Belgium (B) – Netherlands (NL)
relative GDP per capita between 1500 and 2000. We take the same parameter values
as in section 3.2 and assume that one period in the model is equivalent to a third of a
century.
We set the initial level of knowledge for Belgium, hB,0, and the initial level of habits for
the Netherlands, aNL,0, at their steady state values. The two other initial conditions,







Figure 6: Simulated (dots) vs Actual (solid) Relative GDP per capita – B/NL
hNL,0 and aB,0, are chosen to match the relative GDP per capita in 1500 and 1600 as
provided by Maddison (1995). The initial stocks of capital ki,0 are related to the initial
stocks of knowledge through conditions (13). The system (14)-(17) is then solved for
t = 1..15. Figure 6 compares the simulated with the actual series. The model predicts
well the drop in Belgium’s relative GDP from 1600 to 1700; the low point seems to be fairly
well captured, although we do not have observations between 1700 and 1800 to precisely
identify this point. In the model economy, Belgium overtakes the Netherlands in 1866,
while this actually takes place in 1880. Then, Belgium stays above the Netherlands in
the model economy, while it falls below it around 1940 in the series.
In the literature on the history of the Netherlands, the expansion of the sixteenth century
is closely related to investment in knowledge, while the decline of the eighteenth century
is associated to a lack of investment to remain the leader. De Vries and Van Der Woude
(1997) note the substantial investment in “human capital” realized by the Netherlands:
“The occupational structure of this economy was such that a large fraction of the la-
bor force required formal education and occupational training, both of which required
investment, at least in terms of foregone income. (...) The early rise of basic literacy
rates, the large proportion of the labor force trained in formal apprenticeships, and the
large proportion, by the standards of that time, enrolled in universities and illustrious
schools, all reﬂect a substantial investment in human capital formation” (p. 694-695). As
for the decline, Burke (1974) notes that “Dutch regents were not merchants. They did
17year 1500 Belgium (B) the Netherlands (NL) B/NL
Knowledge (hi,0) 0.598 0.491 1.219
Habit stock (ai,0) 4.033 3.147 1.281
GDP per capita* 875 754 1.16
*Source: Maddison (1995)
Table 1: Initial conditions for Belgium and the Netherlands in 1500
not take risks on the sea, but derived their incomes from houses, lands and securities,
and so allowed the sea to be lost”. Burke (1974) also provides evidence about the shift
in occupations of Dutch regents. From 1618 to 1650, only 33% of regents were without
occupation (and thus rentiers); this number rose to 73% over the years 1702 to 1748.
Table 1 gives the initial conditions responsible for these long waves of decline and re-
birth. As we said above, we set the relative initial consumption habits and knowledge to
match the ﬁrst two observations (1500 and 1600); initial consumption habits are higher
in Belgium than in the Netherlands by 28% and initial knowledge by 21%. These levels
are consistent with high urbanization rates in Belgium before 1500. Urbanization rates
are indeed correlated with education and knowledge, since schools and universities were
essentially located in cities, and with high consumption habits, since luxury goods were
available in cities through trade. Figures in Bairoch, Batou, and Ch` evre (1988) show that
before 1500 Belgium had the highest urbanization rate in Europe (it is also the highest
urbanization rate ever observed in the world over the period 1000-1800) and far above
the Dutch rate.
In summary, the main lesson that can be drawn from Table 1 is that consumption habits
in Belgium exceed the Dutch level by a larger extent than knowledge, and this is able to
generate the relative decline of Belgium after 1500.
6 Conclusion
The decline of civilizations has often been associated with excessive consumption, to the
detriment of investment and education. Wealth breeds ﬁrst more wealth, and then decline,
according to Kindleberger (1996). We have formalized this idea in a two-region model:
when one region leads, its inhabitants develop consumption habits incompatible with the
18necessary investment in knowledge to remain the leader. This opens the possibility for
the other region to catch up and gain economic primacy.
We have learned from the theoretical model that persistent diﬀerences across regions that
are similar in their characteristics may persist even when physical capital ﬂows from rich
regions to poor ones. Perfect capital mobility helps but does not guarantee a fast and
monotonic convergence process.
We have exploited the economic implications of the Hopf bifurcation to show that diﬀer-
ent patterns of regional development may emerge as a function of initial conditions. In
particular, regional dynamics can display alternating primacy if the initial dispersion of
knowledge is high and habit formation is strong. Irreversible decline happens when rich
regions develop unsustainable habits. When the weight of habits is low, our model behaves
like the traditional neo-classical growth model and monotonic convergence prevails.
Contrary to the models of economic geography where agglomeration forces often imply
catastrophic outcomes, our model based on consumption habits does not necessarily pre-
dict the disappearance of certain activities within regions. Moreover, poor regions can
overtake rich ones without the need for an exogenous shock; this is an endogenous out-
come of the model, based on the dynamics of consumption patterns. Our aim was not
to claim than exogenous shocks were unimportant to account for development dynamics
but to stress that they are not necessary to account for reversals of leadership.
Our model shares common elements with the Shumpeterian view of economic change,
as developed in the recent book by Mokyr (2002). In his chapter 6, Mokyr mentions a
“law” according to which the leader always looses its primacy and never gains it back.
This is explained by the formation of groups opposing innovation. Even if technological
innovation enhances growth, it entails losers and winners, and some groups always oppose
to it. Conservatism is not the same idea as habit formation, but it is close to it. Contrary
to Mokyr’s view, our dynamic analysis shows that a decline is not necessarily irreversible,
and rebirth may arise if the period of poverty cleans up the forces working against growth.5
Two extensions of the present framework can be considered for future research: ﬁrst, the
interactions between regions are not limited to capital movements or trade; knowledge
spillovers can play an important role. Second, cross-border envy eﬀects can be easily
5This property comes from our two region framework; when the leader declines it is the old leading
region which takes the lead again. This is not necessarily true in an n-region model.
19modelled in our set-up. We wonder whether these additional interactions between regions
will foster or hamper convergence, and whether long waves can be shortened or lengthened.
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22A Proof of proposition 1
The steady state is computed from equations (14)-(17). The ﬁrst step consists in expressing hi
only in terms of ai, using (14)-(15):
hi = λ(1 − γ)ai, i = A,B. (23)




















Equations (24) and (25) imply aA = aB = ¯ a, and kA = kB = ¯ k, which in turn imply hA = hB =
¯ h. Thus the steady state is proved to be symmetric. Once symmetry is taken into account, the
steady state (¯ k, ¯ a, ¯ h), as expressed in Proposition 1, is the only solution to equations (14)-(17).
Q.E.D.
B Proof of proposition 2
Let us express the dynamic system with seven equations and seven unknowns instead of using
the redundant free system of the main text made up of four equations and four unknowns. It
turns out that the Jacobian of the system with seven variables can be worked out more easily.
For the sake of simplicity, we denote φ = 1−α

























































1−α + (φRtkB,t − γaB,t)
µ
1−α
φRt(kA,t+kB,t) − γ(aA,t + aB,t)
!1−α
23The linearized system is:


   
  
   


hA,t+1 − ¯ h
aA,t+1 − ¯ a
kA,t+1 − ¯ k
hB,t+1 − ¯ h
aB,t+1 − ¯ a
kB,t+1 − ¯ k
Rt+1 − ¯ R


   
  
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   


hA,t − ¯ h
aA,t − ¯ a
kA,t − ¯ k
hB,t − ¯ h
aB,t − ¯ a
kB,t − ¯ k
Rt − ¯ R
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  

where ¯ R and ¯ k stand for the steady state values of the interest rate and physical capital, and
R0
a =













Let us brieﬂy describe the steps to compute the eigenvalues of J. Since the ﬁrst and fourth
columns of |J −`I| contain only one element diﬀerent from zero (−`), we can apply the Laplace
expansion twice. Next, we add the ﬁrst column of the new determinant to the third and the
second to the fourth. Then, we substract the third row to the ﬁrst, and afterwards we add the
fourth to the second. Thereafter, we multiply the third and fourth column by −1
2 and we add
the result to the ﬁrst and second column respectively. We multiply the ﬁrst and the second row
by 1
2 and add the result to the third and the fourth row respectively. Multiplying the third row
by −β and adding it to the fourth row, we obtain:
24| ˜ J| =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
`2
Therefore, | ˜ J| can be computed as:
| ˜ J| = `2
￿































1−α ¯ R − `
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
The ﬁrst determinant can be further developed:
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β(1 − γ) −`
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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+ (µ + α)H(γ) −
r￿ γδ
1 + δ
+ (µ + α)H(γ)
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+ (µ + α)H(γ) +
r￿ γδ
1 + δ
+ (µ + α)H(γ)
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− 4γ(µ + α)H(γ)
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Following Ruelle (1989), a dynamic system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation if:










in the neighborhood of γ1.
c) The other eigenvalues have modulus less than unity.
The condition a) is veriﬁed as follows:
We ﬁrst compute the values of γ for which complex eigenvalues have modulus 1. We exploit the










Thus, the values of γ solving |`1,2| = 1 are:
γ1 =
(1 + δ)(1 + α + µ) −
p
(1 + δ)2(1 + α + µ)2 − 4δ(1 + δ)(α + µ)
2δ(α + µ)
γ2 =
(1 + δ)(1 + α + µ) +
p
(1 + δ)2(1 + α + µ)2 − 4δ(1 + δ)(α + µ)
2δ(α + µ)
The values of γ solving |`3,4| = 1 are:
γ3 =
(1 + δ)(1 − α + µ) −
p
(1 + δ)2(1 − α + µ)2 − 4δµ(1 + δ)(1 − α)
2δµ
γ4 =
(1 + δ)(1 − α + µ) +
p
(1 + δ)2(1 − α + µ)2 − 4δµ(1 + δ)(1 − α)
2δµ
For these values to be real the model’s parameters should verify the following constraint:
(1 + δ)(1 + α + µ)2 > 4δ(α + µ),
(1 + δ)(1 − α + µ)2 > 4δµ(1 − α).
It is true that γ1 < γ2 and that γ3 < γ4, but also that γ1 < γ3. One can conclude that γ1 is
the smallest value of γ for which a bifurcation may appear. Moreover, one can show through
algebraic computations that: 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ 1, implying that γ1 is a feasible value for γ. Thus, as γ
26increases from 0 to 1, the ﬁrst Hopf bifurcation may appear when γ reaches γ1. We therefore
check conditions a) and b) for the ﬁrst couple of eigenvalues `1,`2. Further, it will also be
proved that the remaining couple of eigenvalues is smaller than one in modulus.
To check the ﬁrst of the Hopf’s necessary conditions, the third power of the eigenvalue associated




γ1 is non zero, `3






￿2 is a complex number with a non zero complex part. Hence, condition a)
holds at γ = γ1.
In what follows, necessary conditions are given for condition b) to hold. As |`1| = |`2| in a










1 + δ(1 − γ)2
(1 − γ)2 [γ(µ + α)H(γ)]
− 1
2 > 0.
By continuity, there exists a neighborhood of γ1 such that
∂|`1,2|
∂γ > 0.
Finally, it only remains to verify c), i.e. that `3,`4 have a modulus smaller than one. We prove
condition c) in the interval (0,γ3), which includes the interval (0,γ1). Let us call γ the value of
γ such that this couple becomes complex. Since |`3| < |`4| in (0,γ), it is suﬃcient to prove that






















It is true that since |`4| > 0, then |`4| < 1 if and only if |`4|2 < 1. This happens when:
µ(1 + δ(1 − γ))





Since α + µ < 1 , it follows that |`4| < 1 in (0,γ).
In the interval (γ,γ3), `3,`4 are complex, with modulus:






















where H0(γ) = 1




￿ ￿ ￿ > 0. As |`4| = 1 at γ3, then
|`4| < 1 in (γ,γ3).
Hence, it has been proved that |`3,4| < 1 in (0,γ3), which implies that |`3,4| < 1 in (0,γ1) since
(0,γ1) ⊂ (0,γ3). Q.E.D.
27C Proof of proposition 3
To prove the proposition, we ﬁrst prove that `1,2 becomes complex for the ﬁrst time for γ = ˆ γ
and `3,4 at γ = γ . ˆ γ is deﬁned below. Then, to complete the proof, we prove that the moduli
of both pairs of eigenvalues are smaller than one in (0,γ1).





+ (µ + α)H(γ)
￿2
− 4γ(µ + α)H(γ) =
=
(γδ(1 − γ) + (µ + α)(1 + δ(1 − γ)))
2 − 4γ(µ + α)(1 + δ)(1 − γ)(1 + δ(1 − γ))
(1 + δ)2(1 − γ)2 .
F1,2(γ) has at most four real roots and a vertical asymptote at γ = 1. ˆ γ is the closest root to
γ1, with ˆ γ < γ. F1,2(γ) roots are the points were
(γδ(1 − γ) + (µ + α)(1 + δ(1 − γ)))
2 = 4γ(µ + α)(1 + δ)(1 − γ)(1 + δ(1 − γ)),
that is, the intersection points of a fourth degree polynomial P4 and a third degree polynomial
P3. For given values of the parameters µ, α and δ, P3 is negative for γ < 0, positive when
γ ∈ (0,1), negative after for a given interval before becoming positive. P4 is always positive,
reaching its minimum for γ ∈ (0,1). This means that at most, P3 and P4 have two intersection
points within (0,1). The ﬁrst of these corresponds to ˆ γ and the second one to a value of γ larger




To prove that `3,4 is a couple of real eigenvalues in (0,γ) and complex in (γ,γ3), we proceed as














(γδ(1 − γ)(1 − α) + µ(1 + δ(1 − γ)))
2 − 4γµ(1 − α)(1 + δ)(1 − γ)(1 + δ(1 − γ))
(1 − α)2(1 + δ)2 .
F3,4 has at most four real roots which coincide with the values of γ where
(γδ(1 − γ)(1 − α) + µ(1 + δ(1 − γ)))
2 = 4γµ(1 − α)(1 + δ)(1 − γ)(1 + δ(1 − γ)).
As we did before, we characterize the intersection points between a fourth degree polynomial P0
4
and a third degree polynomial P0
3. These polynomials behave exactly as P3 and P4, therefore
the conclusions are also identical.
Notice now that F3,4 < F1,2, and this is true since µ+α >
µ
1−α. Therefore, the pair `3,4 becomes
ﬁrst complex, which implies that γ < ˆ γ.
28We prove now that |`1| and |`2| are smaller than one in (0,γ1). First, observe that `1 < `2 when
they are both real. Therefore, if we prove that |`2| < 1 in (0, ˆ γ), we obtain immediately the







+ (µ + α)H(γ) +
r￿ γδ
1 + δ
+ (µ + α)H(γ)
￿2
− 4γ(µ + α)H(γ)
￿
.
If |`2| were real and attained the value 1 outside the interval (0,1), it would mean that |`2| is
smaller than 1 in (0, ˆ γ). This is true since |`2| is a continuous function. |`2| attains the value 1
for γ = 1+δ
δ , which is larger than 1 ∀ δ.
It remains to be proved that the couple `1,2 also has a modulus smaller than the one when







1 + δ(1 − γ)2
(1 − γ)2 [γ(µ + α)H(γ)]
− 1
2 .
Since γ and H(γ) are positive in (ˆ γ,γ1),
∂|`1,2|
∂γ > 0 in (ˆ γ,γ1). Consequently, |`1,2| achieves its
maximum at γ = γ1.
Regarding the moduli of (`3,`4), proposition 2 showed that they are smaller than 1 in (0,γ3).
Q.E.D.
D Proof of proposition 4
The eigenvalues of the system coincide with `1,2, already computed in the proof of proposition
2, in Appendix B. Therefore, the point of bifurcation is the same as in the capital mobility
case, and equal to γ1. Hence, the stability properties are also the same. For γ < ˆ γ the system
converges monotonically, for values of γ between ˆ γ and γ1, convergence is oscillatory. When
γ = γ1 the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation, and it diverges after this value.
To prove that the speed of convergence is slower when capital is immobile, we will show that
|`1,2| > |`3,4| when γ > ˆ γ. For these values of γ, the dynamics of both models (with and without









Then, |`1,2| > |`3,4| holds since µ + α >
µ
1−α. Q.E.D.
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